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This paper presents econometric analyses on the determination of bank deposit 
and lending rates using longitudinal Finnish data. Interest rate pass-through is 
very strong, possibly complete, in the case of lending rates; in the case of deposit 
rates the pass-through is far from complete, even in the long term. The monetary 
union has benefited customers by decreasing the average rate on new loans. Credit 
and interest rate risk premiums are clearly observable in banks' lending rates. The 
impact of money market rates on loan stock rates seems to have been non-linear; 
no obvious explanation for this phenomenon has been found. 
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Pankkikorot pienessä eurooppalaisessa maassa – 
makrotason tuloksia suomalaisella aineistolla 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
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Tässä keskustelualoitteessa esitetään suomalaista pitkittäisaineistoa käyttäen eko-
nometrisiä analyysejä pankkien talletus- ja luottokorkojen määräytymisestä. 
Markkinakorkojen välittyminen luottokorkoihin on erittäin voimakas, mahdolli-
sesti täydellinen. Talletuskoroissa läpimeno on selvästi epätäydellinen jopa pitkäl-
lä aikavälillä. Rahaliitto on hyödyttänyt asiakkaita alentamalla uusien luottojen 
korkoja. Luotto- ja korkoriskien preemiot ovat selvästi havaittavissa pankkien 
luottokoroissa. Rahamarkkinakorkojen vaikutus luottokannan korkoihin näyttää 
olleen tuntemattomasta syystä epälineaarinen. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkitoiminta, korot 
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In many fields of economics, the concepts of the interest rate and the yield curve 
are used in an excessively simple way, as if all the agents in the economy had 
access to a perfectly competitive loan market. In real life, this assumption barely 
holds for the government and a few other institutions, including banks and a 
handful of major corporations. Nearly all the households and most business 
undertakings have access to loan markets mainly through the banking industry. 
Banks are the most important source of loans, and deposits are a highly important 
financial asset in every developed economy. Hence, when one evaluates the 
impact of the interest rate on households’ and SME businesses’ behaviour, banks’ 
customer rates are certainly at least as relevant as market rates. 
  There are two established fields of literature analysing bank rates, namely the 
monetary policy transmission research and the literature on competition in the 
banking industry. 
  Empirical literature on monetary policy transmission analyses the impact of 
central bank policy rates on the economy. A central field of research has been the 
transmission of policy rates to bank lending and deposit rates, and the lag between 
policy rate movements and the rate on bank loans. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) 
compared the strength of the transmission of monetary policy rates to lending 
rates in 31 countries. The results indicated that the existence of a sizable market 
for short-term monetary instruments, the absence of constraints on capital 
movements; the absence of constraints on bank competition and the private 
ownership of the banking sector reduce the stickiness of lending rates. Mizen and 
Hofmann (2002) found with UK data that the pass-through of policy rates is 
complete for deposit rates in the long term, but not for mortgage rates. Sander & 
Kleimeier (2003) found that monetary policy transmission has become faster and 
stronger in Europe over time. According to Angeloni & Ehrmann (2003) the 
monetary policy transmission has probably strengthened because of the EMU. 
  A separate sub-field of the monetary policy transmission literature has 
focused on the heterogeneity of banks and their solvency and balance sheet 
structures, and how these differences have affected banks’ behaviour in the credit 
market. This so-called bank lending channel literature mainly consists of analyses 
on how changes in central bank policy rates are reflected in the quantity of bank 
lending, but Gambacorta (2004) analysed the heterogeneity of interest rate pass-
through on bank lending rates in Italy; there was evidence in favour of the 
existence of the credit channel of monetary policy, even though this heterogeneity 
between banks seemed to be above all a short-term phenomenon.  
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  The analysis of competition between banks as a determinant of bank rates has 
become an important sub-field of the industrial organisation literature. These 
studies focus almost by definition on differences between banks. Hutchison 
(1995) presented a survey of several papers published in the late 1980s and early 
1990s and concluded that retail deposit rates tend to be lower in concentrated 
regional markets. Berstein and Fuentes (2003a) found with Chilean data that 
banks’ deposit rates react more slowly to changes in market rates in concentrated 
local markets. Canhoto (2003) found evidence of banks’ market power in the 
deposit market with Portuguese data, even though deregulation had enhanced 
competition. Rosen (2003) found with U.S. data that the presence of large banks 
in a local market makes deposit rates higher and less rigid, when controlled for 
market concentration; market concentration decreases deposit rates in urban 
markets, but not in rural ones. Hannan and Prager (2001) reached a somewhat 
different result; the local presence of banks with branches in many different areas 
makes deposit rates lower. Angbazo (1997) found that all banks price default risk 
in their loan margins, but not all of them price the interest rate risk. Berstein and 
Fuentes (2003b) found with Chilean data that loan rates were less sticky in big 
banks with relatively few individual customers. The results of Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2004) may be particularly interesting because some of 
their findings might be observable in aggregate longitudinal data. They analysed a 
large bank level panel data from European countries. They concluded that the 
bank interest rate margin depends on competition, interest rate risk, credit risk, 
risk aversion and operating expenses. The margin was proxied by the difference 
between interest revenue and financial costs in relation to total assets. The authors 
observed no evidence of increased rivalry, and the decrease in the margin seemed 
to be due to reduction in interest rate risk, credit risk and operating costs. 
  This paper takes a somewhat different approach. It is entirely based on 
aggregate data and no attention is paid to differences between banks or geographic 
areas. In this sense the analyses to be presented in the following are not essentially 
different from the literature on monetary policy transmission. However, unlike 
many contributions in the monetary policy transmission literature, the following 
analyses pay attention to different kinds of bank rate determinants in longitudinal 
data, and the focus is not solely on the impact of market and policy rates on bank 
rates. Some of the explanatory variables to be tested have been used in previous 




1.2 The  Finnish  banking market after liberalisation 
The Finnish banking market was tightly regulated for several decades, but a 
widespread deregulation took place in the 1980s. A highly important measure was 
the gradual relaxation of interest rate regulations 1983 onwards. A rapid monetary 
expansion followed in the late 1980s, leading to an asset price bubble. Over the 
years 1991–1994 the Finnish economy underwent the worst depression in any 
OECD country after the Second World War. The banking sector was seriously 
affected. The problems were mainly manifested as loan losses. The situation was 
probably worsened by the combination of widespread lending in foreign 
currencies to customers with no foreign currency denominated income and the 
devaluation of the Finnish markka first in November 1991 and again in September 
1992. Banks’ cumulative losses in 1991–1995 exceeded the regulatory capital of 
deposit banks at the end of 1990 (Vihriälä 1997, p. 40). However, there was no 
run on any bank, possibly because of government capital injections and an explicit 
guarantee by the parliament. The sector has been profitable since 1996, and 
especially during the boom of 1999–2000 banks were very profitable. 
  The Finnish banking market has been relatively concentrated at least since the 
1930s, but concentration increased even further during the crisis when weak 
banking groups were merged with rivals. The operations of Skopbank, STS bank 
and most of the small savings banks were taken over by rivals in 1992–1993. The 
two major commercial banks merged in 1995; the new merged entity has become 
a member of the Nordea banking group. Currently, there are only three major 
banking groups, namely Nordea, The OP Bank Group (also known as the 
amalgamation of cooperative banks) and the Sampo Group. Moreover, there is a 
number of small banks and banking groups. If concentration is measured with the 
Herfindahl index of total assets, the Finnish banking market was the most 
concentrated in EU 15 in 2001 (ECB 2002, Statistical annex, Table 7). Unless 
Nordea Bank Finland is considered a foreign bank, the presence of foreign 
institutions has remained limited, especially in retail banking. 
  A liquid interbank money market based on certificates of deposits emerged 
after certain reforms in 1987, and the Bank of Finland began to calculate markka 
money market rates, known as Helibor rates. The market for bonds remained 
illiquid, mainly because the public sector had a very limited debt burden and the 
need to issue government bonds was limited. During the depression of the early 
1990s, the financial standing of the government deteriorated dramatically and a 
liquid market for markka denominated government bonds emerged. Finland was 
one of the first countries to join the single currency, and the calculation of Helibor 
rates was discontinued in December 1998.  The market for corporate bonds has 
remained illiquid.  
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  Certain tax laws are also worth mentioning. There was a specific tax (stamp 
duty) on new loans until April 1998. The tax was 1.5% of the loan sum, 
irrespective of the maturity. An immediate consequence of the abolition of the tax 
was that it became easier for debtors to switch between banks because such a 
switch was no longer taxed. 
  There was a special tax exemption of interest income from bank deposits. 
First, this exemption was applied to certain categories of deposits, but since 1989 
the tax exemption was conditional on the interest rate. When the exemption was to 
be abolished in 2000, the interest income on a personal account was not taxable 
unless the interest rate was higher than 2%; if the rate was higher, the whole 
interest income was taxable. 
  Finland has a universal banking model. Deposit banks offer all kinds of 
financial services, with the exception of insurance. Nothing prevents banks from 
owning insurance companies, and all the major banking groups have their own 
life insurance companies. 
  There is very little systematic analysis on banking competition in Finland. 
The last research results may have been published by Vesala (1995). His data was 
from the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and the results indicated that the market 
for loans was much more competitive than the market for deposits. Some of the 
following results are consistent with this finding, even though no systematic 
analysis on competition is presented. 
 
 
1.3 The  data 
The analysis is based on aggregate quarterly data on the Finnish banking sector 
and the Finnish economy in 1993–2003. Some experiments were made with a 
longer data period covering the years 1987–2003, but it proved to be surprisingly 
difficult to develop models that would suit the whole era of non-regulated interest 
rates. The behaviour of banks as interest rate setters seems to have changed 
permanently and fundamentally during the banking crisis of the early 1990s. It is 
also possible that bond rates were distorted by illiquidity until central government 
debt skyrocketed in the early 1990s, implying that regressions using the bond rate 
as an explanatory variable are affected by this problem. In all the following 
analyses the estimation period has been Q1/1993–Q4/2003, even though lagged 
data for 2002 is included in the set of explanatory variables in many cases. 
  The data on bank interest rates has been collected and compiled by the Bank 
of Finland, and it includes all the domestic operations of all the deposit banks, 
including branches of foreign banks. Instead, loans and deposits in domestic 
banks’ offices abroad are not included. The data are collected at the 
unconsolidated level, ie including intra-group operations and excluding banks’  
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subsidiaries. The data used in the analyses is purely longitudinal; there is no cross-
sectional dimension. There are three time series on bank rates, namely the rate on 
deposits (RDT), the rate on the loan stock (RLB) and the average rate on new 
loans (RLBN). Each observation of RLB and RDT refers to the last bank day of 
the quarter, whereas RLBN is the average of monthly observations. 
  The short-term market rate (MMRATE) is the average of daily observations 
of the three months money market rate. For the years 1993–1998 it is the Helibor 
rate, and for the euro era it is the Euribor rate. The long-term interest rate (BR) is 
the average of daily observations of the yield on a Finnish government bond with 
four to five years to maturity. 
  If any conclusions can be drawn on 44 observations, none of the interest rate 
series seems to have a unit root during this relatively short period, with the 
possible exception of the average rate on the loan stock (RLB). (See Appendix 1). 
Interestingly, this result seems to be highly dependent on the sample, and if one 
includes the years 1991–1992, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected. A 
likely explanation is the very high level of interest rates that prevailed before 
September 1992. Nevertheless, the fact that most of the interest rates seem to have 
been stationary (or nearly stationary) over the observation period makes it less 
problematic to run regressions in levels. Even if there were more observations it 
would make little sense to make cointegration analyses with the data because the 
key variables are stationary rather than unit root processes. 
 
 
2 Empirical  results 
2.1 Deposit  rates 
There are certain obvious explanatory variables to be used in the regressions, such 
as the money market rate (MMRATE) and the bond rate (BR). Market rates 
should affect the deposit rate irrespective of whether banks have market power or 
not, even though the effect might be stronger under perfect competition. 
Moreover, because the deposit rate is probably rather sticky, it is reasonable to 
include the lagged value of the explained variable as an additional explanatory 
variable. 
  If banks have market power, it is likely that the economic benefits of the tax 
exemption of interest on deposits have been divided between banks and their 
customers. The dummy variable VTON denotes the era of the tax exemption. 
EMU membership (EMU) and the trend can also be tested as potential 
explanatory variables. The trend may be a relatively good proxy for banks’ 
technical and operational efficiency, because processes and banking infrastructure 
have probably developed rather smoothly.  
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  After a few experiments with different combinations of explanatory variables 
the following version of the model was reached. 
 
Table 1.   OLS results, determinants of the average interest 






Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.188 -0.501 0.619
RDT(-1) 0.510 19.611 0.000
MMRATE 0.147 7.273 0.000
BR 0.080 6.178 0.000
BR(-2) 0.038 2.409 0.021
VTON -0.083 -1.606 0.117
EMU 0.028 0.612 0.545
@TREND -0.001 -0.355 0.724
R-squared 0.997     Mean dependent var 2.1172
Adjusted R-squared 0.997     S.D. dependent var 1.1173
S.E. of regression 0.064     Akaike info criterion -2.492
Sum squared resid 0.148     Schwarz criterion -2.167
Log likelihood 62.820     F-statistic 1857.4
Durbin-Watson stat 1.449     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  
 
 
The diagnostics of the residual term are presented in the appendix 2. 
  The high statistical significance of the lagged value of the explained variable 
reflects the stickiness of deposit rates. The immediate impact of the money market 
rate on bank deposits is not particularly strong, but it is highly significant. 
Moreover, the impact is gradually accumulated because future values of the 
explanatory variable RDT(-1) depend on it. Instead, in the light of preliminary 
experiments, lagged values of the money market rate were not close to statistical 
significance, when controlled for the lagged value of the explained variable. Past 
values of the bond rate might capture the role of fixed-term deposits made in the 
past. 
  Simplistically, we can calculate that the long-term pass-through of a 
permanent, one percentage shift of the yield curve into the deposit rate is 
(0.147+0.080+0.038)/(1-0.510) ≈  0.54 percentages. The hypothesis that interest 
rate pass-through would be complete in the very long run can be rejected with 
these data. If a permanent parallel shift of the yield curve were transmitted to the  
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long term to the deposit rate as such, the sum of interest rates’ regression 
coefficients, including the coefficient of the lagged explained variable, would 
equal one, which can be rejected with the Wald test. If one does impose this 
restriction on the equation, the residual term becomes strongly autocorrelated.
1 
This finding might be an indication of banks’ market power; under perfect 
competition the interest rate margin would equal the costs of collecting deposits, 
and there is no obvious reason why these costs would be higher during high 
interest rates. 
  There are three highly correlated explanatory variables, namely the trend and 
the two dummy variables, one for the limited tax exemption of interest income on 
deposits (until Q2/2000) and the other one for the EMU membership (since 
Q1/1999). None of these variables is statistically significant alone, but there is 
evidence on their joint impact on the deposit rate. Moreover, dropping off these 
variables causes statistically significant autocorrelation in the error term. 
 
Table 2.   Testing the joint significance of deposits’ tax 
      exemption, EMU and the trend 
      in the table 1 equation 
 
Redundant Variables: VTON EMU @TREND   
F-statistic  3.265229     Probability  0.032353




Because of their high correlation it is difficult to say which of the three variables 
has affected deposit rates. If any conclusions can be drawn on the above results, it 
seems that the abolition of the tax exemption is the most likely candidate for being 
the ‘correct’ explanatory variable; this variable is relatively close to statistical 
significance. If the trend variable is omitted, the tax exemption becomes 
statistically significant (t-value -2.2) whereas the EMU membership does not   
(t-value 0.5). Thus, these results give some relatively weak evidence to support 
the hypothesis that the economic burden of taxation of the interest on deposits is 
partly borne by banks, not solely by depositors. (See equations 2 and 3 in the 
table 3) 
  Paroush (1994) proposed that the minimum reserve requirement imposed on 
banks is reflected in the rate paid to depositors. If no interest is paid on required 
                                                 
1 Wald-test F-statistic (1,36) = 128.8 Prob = 0.0000. The residual term of the resulting regression 
is strongly autocorrelated; Obs R squared of Breusch-Godfrey with 4 lags equals 19,23, which is 
significant at the 0.001 level. The assumption of residual normal distribution is close to being 
rejected, mainly because of skewness.  
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minimum reserve deposits with the central bank, banks incur an indirect cost that 
is proportional to the deposit base, the minimum reserve requirement and the 
opportunity cost of reserves. This opportunity cost is probably strongly dependent 
on the money market rate. An interest rate was paid on these minimum reserve 
deposits still during the first half of the year 1993, but a new system was 
introduced in July 1993, and the interest rate was annulled. This system was in use 
until December 1998. The minimum reserve deposit requirement was 2% of sight 
deposits, 1.5% of time deposits and 1% of many domestic non-deposit debts. 
However, the interaction term of the dummy variable for the Q3/1993–Q4/1998 
era (MIRE) and the money market rate did not prove to be close to statistical 
significance as an explanatory variable. (See equation 1 in the table 3) 
 
Table 3.   OLS results, alternative equations for the average 
      interest rate of deposits 
 
123
C -0.333 -0.319 -0.294
(-0.770) (-5.018***) (-7.458***)
RDT(-1) 0.520 0.513 0.514
(17.555***) (21.327***) (21.560***)
MMRATE 0.148 0.148 0.151
(7.244***) (7.441***) (8.041***)
BR 0.080 0.082 0.081
(6.067***) (7.025***) (7.118***)
BR(-2) 0.037 0.038 0.035
(2.232*) (2.431*) (2.443*)








R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.997  
 
 
2.2  Rates on new loans 
It is relatively easy to list a number of factors that could affect bank lending rates. 
The most obvious factor is the marginal cost of funding, which can be measured 
with market rates, both the short money market rate and the bond rate. At least 
according to the Monti-Klein banking model the money market rate is the relevant 
cost of funding when banks’ set their loan rates, and the price and availability of  
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deposits is basically irrelevant (See Freixas & Rochet 1997, 57–61 for reference). 
All the banking groups of the sample have had access to the wholesale market and 
none of them has had to pay a significant risk premium for its loans during the 
data period, which is a central assumption of the Monti-Klein model. 
  A second rather obvious cost factor is the technical efficiency of banks: if the 
operational costs of granting new loans are high, this should be reflected in banks’ 
lending rates. Unfortunately there is no straightforward way to measure 
operational unit costs of granting a new loan. It is likely that the efficiency of 
banks as lenders has improved gradually over time, implying that this factor can 
be proxied by the trend. 
  As a third factor one could mention the risks of lending. The perceived credit 
risk is the most obvious risk factor to be included. The simple number of 
corporate bankruptcy proceedings filed during the quarter (BNKRPTC) was used 
as a proxy for credit risks. The logarithmic value of the number of bankruptcies 
was tested as an alternative specification, but in preliminary estimations it proved 
to have less explanatory power, which is basically intuitive: the loan losses caused 
by a bankrupt customer do not depend on the number of other insolvent debtors, 
implying that the specification should be linear. 
  The bank may also have to run interest rate risks if it grants loans. These risks 
can be proxied by the volatility of interest rates, as in the paper by Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara. The bond rate volatility (BNDRV) is measured with the 
weekly volatility of the five years bond rate. 
  Moreover, it is possible that the EMU has reduced certain financial risks, 
mainly interest rate risks. EMU membership might also have increased 
competition in the case of corporate loans, because the number of banks in 
companies’ home currency area increased when the euro was introduced. 
Moreover, there was a change in statistical definitions. The data includes nothing 
but markka denominated loans until 1998 and euro denominated loans 1999 
onwards. Many companies took DEM denominated loans before the introduction 
of the euro, and the closest substitute of DEM is probably EUR in the new 
financial landscape. Hence a dummy variable for the EMU era (Q1/1999 
onwards) is included as an explanatory variable. 
  The cyclical situation is also a potentially important determinant of lending 
rates. Two opposing hypotheses can be presented. 
 
–  The credit risk depends on the business cycle; during recessions risk 
premiums and loan rates are higher. 
–  If banks have market power, higher demand for loans is reflected in higher 
lending rates, implying that the rate on new loans is higher during booms. 
 
The business cycle is measured by the GDP gap (GDPGAP). This gap is the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 1600) residual of the logarithmic real quarterly GDP.  
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The filtering was done with data for the 1987–2003 period. No structural model 
was used to measure this gap. This residual has negative values during recessions 
and positive values during booms. 
  There is no obvious reason why the rate on new loans would be affected by its 
own past. The set of loan contracts negotiated during a period is independent of 
the contracts negotiated during the previous period. Hence, the lagged value of the 
explained variable is not used as an explanatory variable. As will be seen, this 
specification is consistent with the data. 
  The following final specification of the model was reached after various 
experiments with different combinations of explanatory variables and their lagged 
values. 
 
Table 4.   OLS results, determinants of the average rate 




Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.6471 3.1378 0.0034
MMRATE 0.8453 22.1270 0.0000
GDPGAP -8.1985 -3.7643 0.0006
EMU -0.4736 -6.7139 0.0000
BNDRV 9.5955 3.2545 0.0025
BNDRV(-5) 7.8281 2.4225 0.0206
BR 0.0748 2.5802 0.0141
BNKRPTC(-1) 0.000679 3.9283 0.0004
R-squared 0.993774     Mean dependent var 5.651523
Adjusted R-squared 0.992563     S.D. dependent var 1.871198
S.E. of regression 0.161364     Akaike info criterion -0.647341
Sum squared resid 0.937382     Schwarz criterion -0.322943
Log likelihood 22.2415     F-statistic 820.8873






As can be seen, the fit of the regression is excellent. There are no obvious 
diagnostic problems in the residual term (see Appendix 3). Most of the 
explanatory variables of this final version of the model have the expected signs. 
  In 1993–1994, the average difference between the rate on new loans (RLBN) 
and the three months money market rate (MMRATE) was 2.09. In 2002–2003 it 
was 1.19. Technically, the above regression results indicate that the reduced 
number of bankruptcies and EMU membership contribute to explaining the 
squeeze of the margin.  
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–  EMU membership has contributed 0.47 percentages to the decline in bank 
lending rates. 
–  In 1993–1994, the average number of bankruptcies per quarter was 1629; in 
2002–2003 it was 894. This decline, in the light of the results, has lowered the 
rate on new loans by (1629-894)*0.000679 ≈ 50 basis points. 
 
In total, these two factors seem to have caused a 0.97 percentage points decline in 
loan rates over the observation period. They are more than sufficient to explain 
the observed margin squeeze of 0.8 percentages. The trend variable, instead, did 
not prove to be close to statistical significance (see equations 2 and 3 in table 5), 
even though the technical efficiency of banks has certainly improved substantially 
during the observation period. This may indicate that not much of the productivity 
improvement that has probably taken place has been reflected in interest rates paid 
by customers. Therefore, one might even argue that contrary to common beliefs, 
competition in lending has eased rather than intensified over the observation 
period. This conclusion is similar to the one of Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara 
(2004); if anything, competition eased in European banking markets in the 1990s, 
but this effect was counteracted by a fall in credit risks and improving operational 
efficiency. On the other hand, analysing the mere interest rate spread may be a 
biased way to study banks’ competition in the loan market. Casual observations 
indicate that there has been a decrease in the lending-related fees paid by 
customers in Finland. Unfortunately there is no systematically collected data on 
these fees. 
  It seems that the impact of the business cycle on the credit risk premium is 
stronger than the potential impact of the assumed procyclicality of loan demand 
on lending rates. Bond rate volatility seems to have had a substantial impact on 
loan rates, which is consistent with the results of Maudos and Fernandez de 
Guevara (2004). Volatility seems to have a long-lasting impact on rates of new 
loans. 
  As one might expect, the coefficient on the lagged value of the interst rate on 
new loans does not enter significantly and excluding it has little impact on the 
coefficients of other variables (equation 4 in table 5). This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the rate of new loans is not directly affected by the 
average rate of loans granted in the past, which is intuitive. On the other hand 
GDPGAP is now only marginal, probably reflecting its correlation with the lagged 
value of the rate on new loans. 
  The stamp duty (SDUTY) may have been reflected in lending rates, especially 
if banks have market power. As can be seen in equation 2 in table 5, it is possible 
that the stamp duty made lending rates somewhat higher than what they would 
have otherwise been. This result is counterintuitive; as if customers’ share of the 
economic burden of the tax had been higher than 100%.  
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  Equation five seems to indicate that the cyclical situation has little impact on 
the transmission of monetary policy; the interaction of money market rates and the 
macroeconomic cycle has no explanatory power. Equation six tests the average 
BIS solvency ratio (BISRATIO) of banks as an explanatory variable. The number 
of degrees of freedom is very limited because quarterly data for the pre 1999 era 
is not readily available, but the results based on the very small sample give no 
support to the hypothesis that bank solvency problems would have forced banks to 
restrict loans supply, which would have enabled them to charge higher interest 
rates. In fact, the coefficient is positive, which makes little sense. 
 
Table 5.   OLS results, alternative equations for the average 
      rate of new loans 
 
123 4 5 6
(1999-2003)
C 0.539 -0.486 -0.262 0.507 -0.167 1.165
(2.627*) (-0.681) (-0.353) (2.183*) (-0.218) (1.257)
MMRATE 0.879 0.88 0.845 0.755 0.861 0.822
(21.814***) (22.221***) (22.298***) (9.356***) (18.915***) (7.850***)
GDPGAP -7.636 -6.706 -7.395 -5.383 -9.938 -3.093
(-3.623***) (-3.100**) (-3.287**) (-1.739) (-1.943) (-0.648)
EMU -0.272 -0.385 -0.584 -0.370 -0.586
(-2.263*) (-2.746**) (-5.238***) (-4.298***) (-5.164***)
BNDRV 10.838 10.882 9.575 9.091 9.351 4.575
(3.745***) (3.825***) (3.275**) (3.081**) (3.059**) (0.624)
BNDRV(-5) 6.121 6.283 8.055 6.991 8.207 16.748
(1.905) (1.989) (2.510*) (2.137*) (2.422*) (2.518*)
BR 0.050 0.064 0.088 0.083 0.081 -0.052
(1.651) (2.050*) (2.884**) (2.820**) (2.340*) (-0.588)
BNKRPTC(-1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(3.280**) (3.608**) (3.961***) (3.363**) (3.104**) (-0.439)
SDUTY 0.287 0.302
(2.028) (2.168*)










R-squared 0.994 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.978
Redundant Variables in equation 5: GDPGAP*MMRATE GDPGAP(-1)*MMRATE(-1)
F-statistic 0.496881     Probability 0.612904
Log likelihood ratio 1.305458     Probability 0.520623  
 
 
The hypothesis of complete pass-through of interest rates into banks' lending rates 
is, at least on the surface, somewhat inconsistent with the data. The sum of the  
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regression coefficients of the money market rate (MMRATE) and the bond rate 
(BR) is relatively close to +1, about 0.92, but Wald test rejects the hypothesis that 
the sum would actually equal one in table 4.
2 Nevertheless, because the Wald test 
can be unreliable, and because the fit of the regression is good with reasonable 
diagnostic moderate (there is some residual autocorrelation, see appendix 4), the 
resulting equation presented in table 6 may be of some interest. 
 
Table 6.   Complete pass-through of market rates to new loan 






RLBN = C(1)+C(2)*MMRATE +C(3)*GDPGAP +C(4)*EMU+C(5)
       *BNDRV+C(6)*BNDRV(-5)+(1-C(2))*BR+C(8)*BNKRPTC(-1)
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.5584 2.3243 0.0257
C(2) 0.9227 28.3830 0.0000
C(3) -7.5346 -2.6336 0.0123
C(4) -0.4604 -5.7597 0.0000
C(5) 12.1044 3.7458 0.0006
C(6) 6.1321 1.6738 0.1026
C(8) 0.0004 2.8819 0.0065
R-squared 0.991629     Mean dependent var 5.651858
Adjusted R-squared 0.990272     S.D. dependent var 1.870801
S.E. of regression 0.184518     Akaike info criterion -0.397232
Sum squared resid 1.259732     Schwarz criterion -0.113383
Log likelihood 15.7391    Durbin-Watson stat 1.188941 
 
 
2.3 Loan  stock  rates 
2.3.1 Potential  determinants of the loan stock rate 
 
We will next present estimation results from a model for the average rate on the 
outstanding stock of loans. Our measure of average rate includes interest rates on 
both corporate loans and household loans. In practice, household loans account 
for more than 50% of the loan stock. The relative share of household loans in the 
stock is larger than in the case of new loans because the average maturity of 
corporate loans is shorter. A typical corporate loan remains in the stock of 
outstanding loans for a relatively short period of time. 
  Lending at fixed rates is not particularly commonplace in Finland; fixed rate 
loans accounted for 7% of the loan stock in June 2002 (BoF 2003, p. 139). Most 
loans are re-priced regularly according to changes in reference rates. For corporate 
                                                 
2 F-statistic (1,36) = 8.2207; Prob = 0.0069.  
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loans the typical reference rate is a relatively short money market rate, whereas 
household loans are usually pegged on either the 12 months rate or the prime rate 
of the bank itself. Each major banking group has such a prime rate. The bank 
itself adjusts its prime rate regularly according to changes in the general interest 
rate level. The use of money market rates has increased and the use of the base 
rate, a reference rate set by the government, has decreased over time (see BoF 
2003, p. 136). Both the base rate and the prime rates reflect the general level of 
market rates. 
  The average interest rate of the loan stock is a simple function of relatively 
few factors, including changes in reference rates, the rates of new loans, the 
quantity of new loans and amortizations of old loans. Very few components of 
this process reflect behavioural choices of optimising agents. Basically, there are 
only two such factors, namely the prime rates that are set by banks themselves and 
the renewal process of the loan stock. Neither of these variables is explicitly 
included in the model of the table 7. 
  The loan stock re-pricing process is rather fuzzy because of the huge diversity 
of interest rate pegs, changes in the structure of these pegs and endogenously 
determined loan stock turnover. The amount of prepayments and the demand for 
new loans probably depend on macroeconomic factors and interest rates, which 
makes the impact of market rates on the average rate of the loan stock even more 
complicated. The abolition of the stamp duty probably changed the dynamics of 
prepayments. Therefore, it is not possible to say ex ante which combination of 
explanatory variables should be the best one. It would hardly be possible to 




2.3.2  Searching for a good fit 
 
Different combinations and interactions of explanatory variables were tested. In 
practice, the final version of the regression equation was developed with an 
exploratory three stage process 
 
1.  Different combinations and interactions of potentially relevant explanatory 
variables and their squared values to detect possible non-linearity were tested. 
These explanatory variables included market rates, the trend and the lagged 
value of the dependent variable. 
2.  All the promising explanatory variables, including interactions between them 
and lagged values, were included in the model. The number of lags was 
optimised with the Akaike and Schwartz criteria; the optimal number of lags 
was found to be two on both criteria.  
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3.  All the non-significant explanatory variables (each lag of an explanatory 
variable being treated as a separate variable) were dropped off.  
 
As can be seen in the following table, the resulting equation has a very strong 
explanatory power. 
 
Table 7.   OLS results, determinants of the average interest 




Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.1520 -1.7762 0.0847
RLB(-1) 0.7843 20.1731 0.0000
RLBN(-2) 0.0811 2.3324 0.0257
MMRATE(-1) 0.2496 4.8625 0.0000
MMRATE(-1)^2 -0.0378 -5.1694 0.0000
MMRATE(-2)^2 0.0164 5.3403 0.0000
BR 0.0762 3.2654 0.0025
BR(-1) -0.0794 -2.2368 0.0320
BR(-2) 0.0616 2.6523 0.0121
(MMRATE-MMRATE(-2))*@TREND 0.0056 17.5184 0.0000
R-squared 0.999119     Mean dependent var 6.243722
Adjusted R-squared 0.998885     S.D. dependent var 1.777903
S.E. of regression 0.059362     Akaike info criterion -2.613617
Sum squared resid 0.11981     Schwarz criterion -2.20812
Log likelihood 67.49958     F-statistic 4281.989





As can be seen in the appendix 5, there is no evidence on residual term 
autocorrelation or non-normality of residuals. Nevertheless, the evidence on 
heteroscedasticity of residuals is relatively close to significance. 
  Two explanatory variables of this equation need to be commented, namely 
 
1.  the interaction of the difference of the money market rate and the trend 
2.  the squared value of the money market rate. 
 
As can be seen in table 7, the short-term impact of the interaction of the trend and 
the change of the money market rate {@TREND*(MMRATE-MMRATE(-2))} is 
highly significant, implying that the immediate impact of the money market rate 
on the average rate of the loan stock has been strengthening over time. This 
probably reflects the increasing use of Helibor and Euribor rates as reference  
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rates. In this specification the long-term impact of this interaction on the loan 
stock rate is forced to zero. A permanent increase in the money market rate has an 
immediate impact on the loan stock rate, but despite of the persistence of the loan 
stock rate, the effect through this interaction term gradually vanishes. As can be 
seen in the second equation of table 8, if one relaxes the condition that the 
interaction of the trend and the money market rate cannot have a permanent 
impact on the average rate of the loan stock, two problems arise. First, the R
2 
adjusted for the number of degrees of freedom marginally deteriorates. Secondly, 
the error term becomes autocorrelated. In this alternative specification the two 
interaction terms have regression coefficients that almost offset each other, and 
Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
@TREND*MMRATE and @TREND*MMRATE(-2) in equation 2 of the table 8 
sum up to zero (F-stat 0.524, prob 0.47). Hence, the specification used in the table 
six is consistent with the data. 
  The significance of the squared terms reflects the non-linear relationship 
between the loan stock rate and the money market rate. The main conclusion 
related to this non-linearity is that the money market rate affects the average rate 
of the loan stock weakly when interest rates are high. The presence of the squared 
terms gives rise to the possibility of a perverse effect of money market rates on 
loan rates. Technically, if the money market rate were higher than 5.83, the long-
term direct impact of a small change in the money market rate on the bank lending 
rate would, according to the results, be negative. If the indirect impact of money 
market rates through the rate on new loans is included, the total long-term impact 
of the money market rate on the rate on new loans would be negative with a 
money market rate higher than 7.42. Money market rates higher than this were 
observed only during the first half of the year 1993, but not under more normal 
economic circumstances since then. Nevertheless, the results of the above analysis 
are local in the sense that they do not apply at very high market rates. 
  One possible explanation to the non-linear relationship between money 
market rates and bank loan rates might be the impact of interest rates on the 
demand for new loans; if rates are low, the demand for loans strengthens and new 
loans become rapidly a substantial part of the loan stock, implying that the market 
rate affects strongly the average rate of the loan stock. However, the evidence 
does not seem to favour such an interpretation. The ratio of new loans to the loan 
stock multiplied by the rate on new loans was not close to statistical significance, 
at least not in a relatively simple specification. The results are presented in the 
first equation in table 8. (NEWLOAN = Quantity of new loans granted during the 
period, LBTOT = Stock of loans at the end of the period.) Unsurprisingly, the 
statistical significance of the average rate on new loans weakens, but there is 
almost no change in the regression coefficients of the squared market rates. 
  Controlling for the 12 month Helibor/Euribor rate (RATE12M) has no impact 
on the statistical significance of the squared terms, implying that a possible  
23 
correlation between the convexity of the yield curve and the level of short rates is 
not a likely explanation to the statistical significance of the squared term (see 
equation 3 in table 8). Neither can the non-linearity be explained by a hypothetical 
non-linear impact of money market rates on the rate of new loans. It might also be 
possible that the reference rates defined by banks themselves, the prime rates, 
have reacted to market rates in a non-linear way, but the median of the prime rates 
of the major banking groups does not seem to have such a property. (See appendix 
6.) 
  It would also be possible to argue that there has been a reverse causality; high 
interest rates of the bank loan stock affect the money market rate, possibly in a 
non-linear way. This might have been possible especially before the introduction 
of the euro because the Helibor rate was an indicator of the market rate of Finnish 
banks’ CDs, and the risk premium of these instruments may have depended on 
banks’ interest income. This argument would, consequently, suggest that we use 
IV-estimation to account for the implied endogeneity problem. However, the 
2SLS estimation results presented in equation 4 of the table 8, do not seem to 
contradict our previous OLS-results. The monetary policy tender rate (MPR) is a 
highly important instrument in the 2SLS estimation. 
  It is possible to calculate an estimate for the long-term impact of market 
interest rates on the rate of the bank loan stock. There are three factors to be taken 
into account. 
 
–  According to the results of table 4, a one percentage point increase in the 
short-term money market rate increases the rate on new loans by 0.845 
percentage points, which increases the rate of the loan stock by 
0.0811*0.845 ≈  0.0685 percentage points, when no cumulative effects are 
taken into account. 
–  Moreover, there is the direct linear impact, which is 0.2496 percentage points. 
If one takes the sample mean of MMRATE (4.23) as a reference point, the 
total direct impact of the squared MMRATE on RLB is   
2*4.23*(-0.0378+0.0164) = -0.18086; the total direct impact of MMRATE on 
RLB is +0.2496-0.18086 = +0.0688, which is surprisingly close to zero. 
–  The aggregate impact of the two above mentioned effects is 0.1373. 
–  Because RLB depends on its own past, the effect is accumulated over time, 
and the total long-term impact of a permanent change of MMRATE on RLB, 
taking all the direct and indirect effects into account, equals 
 0.1373+0.7843*0.1373+0.7843^2*0.1373+0.7843^3*0.1373…  = 
 0.168*{1/(1-0.7843)}  ≈ 0.637 
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Table 8.   OLS results, determinants of the average interest 
      rate of the loan stock 
 
123 4  ( 2 S L S )
C -0.310 -0.189 -0.158 -0.227
(-1.846) (-1.889) (-1.866) (-2.214*)
RLB(-1) 0.827 0.810 0.757 0.822
(15.256***) (15.466***) (17.449***) (16.442***)
RLBN(-2) 0.050 0.087 0.097 0.031
(0.990) (2.417*) (2.470*) (0.612)
MMRATE(-1) 0.246358 0.173 0.232 0.296
(2.609*) (1.469) (2.693*) (-4.984***)
BR 0.074 0.071 -0.003 0.061
(2.786**) (2.878**) (-0.078) (2.373*)
BR(-1) -0.078690 -0.075 -0.068 -0.048
(-1.990) (-2.070*) (-1.242) (-1.197)
BR(-2) 0.066 0.058 0.103 0.046
(2.534*) (2.451**) (2.428*) (1.807)
@TREND*(MMRATE-MMRATE(-2)) 0.006 0.004 0.006
(13.789***) (6.198***) (15.718***)
MMRATE(-1)^2 -0.040 -0.033 -0.038 -0.049
(-3.771***) (-3.185**) (-4.524***) (-5.436***)
MMRATE(-2)^2 0.017927 0.015 0.016 0.024

















R-squared 0.9991 0.9991 0.9993 0.9988
Adj R squared 0.9987 0.9989 0.9990 0.9985
Redundant variables in equation 1
   
F-statistic 0.126     Probability 0.944
Log likelihood ratio 0.544     Probability 0.909
F-statistic 2.382     Probability 0.075
Obs*R-squared 10.883     Probability 0.028
 RLB(-1) RLBN(-2)  BR(0 TO -2) MPR(0 TO -3) MPR^2 MPR(-1)^2 MPR(-2)^2 @TREND 
@TREND*(MMRATE-MMRATE(-2))
RLBN*NEWLOAN/LBTOT  RLBN(-1)*NEWLOAN(-1)/LBTOT(-1)   RLBN(-2)*NEWLOAN(-2)/LBTOT(-2)
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for equation 2:





The long-term impact of the bond rate is somewhat simpler to calculate. It is 
(0.0762 -0.0794 +0.0616 +0.0811*0.0748)/(1-0.7843) ≈ 0.299. The results imply 
that in the long term, of a permanent, parallel one percentage point shift in the 
yield curve is transmitted to the average rate of the loan stock as a 0.64+0.30 = 
0.94 percentage point shift. With lower short-term rates the impact is somewhat 
stronger, and with higher rates it is somewhat weaker. 
 
 
2.3.3  Imposing linearity and complete long term pass through 
 
The non-linear specification of the loan stock equation of table 7 is strongly 
supported by the data. However, it is difficult to understand why the effects of 
market rates on the loan stock rate would be non-linear. It is possible, of course, 
that this non-linearity may depend on some unknown sample-specific factors. 
Thus, it may also be reasonable to simply ignore the statistical evidence in this 
context and impose linearity on the equation. In the following specification, all the 
squared terms are omitted. 
  Moreover, there is another property that has been imposed on the following 
equation, namely complete long term pass-through of market rates and rates on 
new loans on the average rate on the loan stock. Hence, in the following 
specification, the sum of regression coefficients of all the interest rates, including 
the rate on new loans, is forced to equal one. After some experiments, the bond 
rate was dropped out because it did not enter significantly. 
 
Table 9.   OLS results, determinants of the average interest 







     +(1-C(2)-C(3)-C(4))*RLBN(-2)+C(5)*(MMRATE-MMRATE(-2))*@TREND
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) 0.1083 2.7369 0.0093
C(2) 0.8426 26.6552 0.0000
C(3) 0.2523 5.8566 0.0000
C(4) -0.2008 -4.8594 0.0000
C(5) 0.0036 7.6927 0.0000
R-squared 0.998545     Mean dependent var 6.243675
Adjusted R-squared 0.998395     S.D. dependent var 1.777975
S.E. of regression 0.071223     Akaike info criterion -2.33935
Sum squared resid 0.197837     Schwarz criterion -2.136601




In the light of the Wald test the hypothesis that the sum of the regression 
coefficients on interest rates on equals one is well consistent with the data, which 
is not very surprising. There are no serious diagnostic problems (See appendix 7). 
Because the hypothesis of complete market rate pass-through to the rate of new 
loans is not entirely inconsistent with the data (see section 2.2), it is possible that 




This paper presents equations on bank rates in Finland over the period 1993–
2003, one for the rate on deposits, two for the rate on new loans and two different 
versions of the equation of the average rate on the loan stock. These equations 
were estimated entirely separately. There is almost no correlation in the error 
terms of the three main regressions of the tables 1, 4 and 7, implying no particular 
need to run SUR regressions. (See appendix 8). 
  Most of the findings are not particularly surprising. Market rates have a very 
strong impact on bank rates, which should not surprise anyone. Money market 
rates have a stronger impact than bond rates. In the case of lending rates, the long-
term pass-through is at least almost perfect. In the case of deposits, the pass-
through is far from perfect even in the long term. There is no evidence that banks’ 
competition with interest rates would have intensified, either in the market for 
deposits or in the market for loans. 
  If banks have market power in the lending market, one might expect that the 
margin between market rates and rates on new loans would be higher during 
booms; a firm with market power would normally react to intense demand not 
only by serving more customers but also by charging higher prices. There is, 
however, no evidence of this kind of pricing. Instead, there is some evidence on 
the existence of extra credit risk premiums during recessions. The credit risk can 
also be relatively well proxied by the number of bankruptcies which does also 
have clear predictive power. 
  Interest rate risks seem to be reflected in the statistical significance of the 
bond rate volatility. As to the development of the average rate on the loan stock, it 
seems that the immediate impact of the money market rate has been strengthening 
over time. Interestingly, the impact of the money market rate on the loan stock 
rate is non-linear; with low interest rates the effect is stronger. No satisfactory 
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Unit root tests of interest rates 
Null hypothesis: variable has a unit root.     
Exogenous:  Constant     








test statistic,       
t-statistic Prob* 
RLBN 1 -3.5460  0.0112
RLB 1 -2.7882  0.0682
RDT 5 -6.2490  0.0000
BR 1 -3.0740  0.0359
MMRATE 1 -3.0341  0.0394
     
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values     
     
Test critical values  1% level  -3.58851   
 5%  level  -2.92973   




Residual tests for the equation for deposits 
Autocorrelation 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 1.575507     Probability 0.2047




Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.160 -0.413 0.683
RDT(-1) 0.008 0.302 0.765
MMRATE -0.010 -0.437 0.665
BR 0.009 0.632 0.532
BR(-2) 0.000 0.028 0.978
VTON 0.028 0.495 0.624
EMU 0.002 0.049 0.961
@TREND 0.001 0.367 0.716
RESID(-1) 0.193 0.929 0.360
RESID(-2) -0.235 -1.167 0.252
RESID(-3) -0.266 -1.361 0.183
RESID(-4) -0.077 -0.360 0.722
R-squared 0.164535     Mean dependent var 0.0000
Adjusted R-squared -0.122656     S.D. dependent var 0.0587
S.E. of regression 0.062204     Akaike info criterion -2.49
Sum squared resid 0.12382     Schwarz criterion -2.003
Log likelihood 66.77529     F-statistic 0.5729







F-statistic 1.323812     Probability 0.2804




Sample (adjusted): 1994Q1 2003Q4
Included observations: 40 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.003 2.550 0.015
RESID^2(-1) 0.389 2.228 0.032
RESID^2(-2) -0.227 -1.225 0.229
RESID^2(-3) 0.100 0.539 0.594
RESID^2(-4) -0.103 -0.592 0.558
R-squared 0.131411     Mean dependent var 0.0034
Adjusted R-squared 0.032144     S.D. dependent var 0.0046
S.E. of regression 0.004504     Akaike info criterion -7.851
Sum squared resid 0.00071     Schwarz criterion -7.64
Log likelihood 162.0206     F-statistic 1.3238








Mean       1.24E-16
Median   0.001761
Maximum 0.104531
Minimum -0.145503
Std. Dev.   0.058708
Skewness   -0.405547
Kurtosis   2.669989
Jarque-Bera 1.405762
Probability 0.495157   
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Residual tests for the first equation for new loans 
Autocorrelation 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 1.004228     Probability 0.419794




Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.1456 -0.6226 0.538
MMRATE -0.0084 -0.2166 0.8299
GDPGAP 1.3229 0.5325 0.598
EMU 0.0458 0.5552 0.5826
BNDRV 0.4715 0.1548 0.8779
BNDRV(-5) 0.3502 0.1061 0.9162
BR 0.0016 0.0561 0.9556
BNKRPTC(-1) 0.0001 0.6228 0.5378
RESID(-1) 0.3364 1.7589 0.0882
RESID(-2) -0.0562 -0.3008 0.7655
RESID(-3) -0.0758 -0.3813 0.7055
RESID(-4) 0.2046 0.9946 0.3274
R-squared 0.111529     Mean dependent var 4.89E-16
Adjusted R-squared -0.193884     S.D. dependent var 0.147647
S.E. of regression 0.161326     Akaike info criterion -0.583775
Sum squared resid 0.832837     Schwarz criterion -0.097178
Log likelihood 24.84306     F-statistic 0.365174







F-statistic 0.700529     Probability 0.596841




Sample (adjusted): 1994Q1 2003Q4
Included observations: 40 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.031 3.11412 0.0037
RESID^2(-1) -0.142 -0.852207 0.3999
RESID^2(-2) -0.115357 -0.687478 0.4963
RESID^2(-3) -0.196368 -1.136188 0.2636
RESID^2(-4) 0.090629 0.526154 0.6021
R-squared 0.074126     Mean dependent var 0.022968
Adjusted R-squared -0.031688     S.D. dependent var 0.031111
S.E. of regression 0.0316     Akaike info criterion -3.954839
Sum squared resid 0.03495     Schwarz criterion -3.743729
Log likelihood 84.09678     F-statistic 0.700529








Mean       4.89E-16
Median   0.001629
Maximum 0.298531
Minimum -0.400182
Std. Dev.   0.147647
Skewness   -0.115377
Kurtosis   2.955387
Jarque-Bera 0.101269




Residual tests for the second equation for new loans; 
Complete pass-through of market rates 
Autocorrelation 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 2.105238     Probability 0.102397




Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) -0.132257 -0.55087 0.5854
C(2) -0.001852 -0.059856 0.9526
C(3) 0.59123 0.214206 0.8317
C(4) 0.048036 0.573851 0.57
C(5) 0.615629 0.199763 0.8429
C(6) 0.684464 0.193748 0.8476
C(8) 7.11E-05 0.477293 0.6363
RESID(-1) 0.441359 2.475136 0.0186
RESID(-2) 0.082697 0.443253 0.6605
RESID(-3) -0.182603 -0.949539 0.3492
RESID(-4) 0.171799 0.866413 0.3925
R-squared 0.203302     Mean dependent var 1.41E-16
Adjusted R-squared -0.038122     S.D. dependent var 0.171161
S.E. of regression 0.174393     Akaike info criterion -0.442693
Sum squared resid 1.003626     Schwarz criterion 0.003355







F-statistic 0.545116     Probability 0.703695




Sample (adjusted): 1994Q1 2003Q4
Included observations: 40 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.036 2.688 0.011
RESID^2(-1) -0.084 -0.503 0.618
RESID^2(-2) -0.158 -0.916 0.366
RESID^2(-3) -0.073 -0.407 0.687
RESID^2(-4) 0.138 0.771 0.446
R-squared 0.058645     Mean dependent var 0.030495
Adjusted R-squared -0.048938     S.D. dependent var 0.040015
S.E. of regression 0.040982     Akaike info criterion -3.434882
Sum squared resid 0.058784     Schwarz criterion -3.223772
Log likelihood 73.69763     F-statistic 0.545116









Mean       1.41E-16
Median   -0.010683
Maximum 0.360542
Minimum -0.421669
Std. Dev.   0.171161
Skewness   -0.050696
Kurtosis   2.777608
Jarque-Bera 0.109521




Residual tests for the first loan stock equation 
Autocorrelation 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 0.958508     Probability 0.444469




Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0045 0.0516 0.9592
RLB(-1) 0.0110 0.2768 0.7838
RLBN(-2) -0.0024 -0.0681 0.9462
MMRATE(-1) -0.0145 -0.2684 0.7903
MMRATE(-1)^2 0.0027 0.3379 0.7378
MMRATE(-2)^2 -0.0012 -0.3557 0.7246
BR -0.0030 -0.1199 0.9054
BR(-1) 0.0048 0.1208 0.9047
BR(-2) -0.0064 -0.2510 0.8035
MMRATE*@TREND-MMRATE(-2)*@T -0.0001 -0.2018 0.8414
RESID(-1) -0.1776 -0.9096 0.3703
RESID(-2) -0.3487 -1.8340 0.0766
RESID(-3) -0.1339 -0.6642 0.5117
RESID(-4) -0.0335 -0.1639 0.8709
R-squared 0.113319     Mean dependent var 1.66E-15
Adjusted R-squared -0.27091     S.D. dependent var 0.052785
S.E. of regression 0.059507     Akaike info criterion -2.552069
Sum squared resid 0.106233     Schwarz criterion -1.984372
Log likelihood 70.14551     F-statistic 0.294926







F-statistic 2.420188     Probability 0.066768




Sample (adjusted): 1994Q1 2003Q4
Included observations: 40 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.003 3.132981 0.0035
RESID^2(-1) -0.079 -0.498721 0.6211
RESID^2(-2) 0.365 2.448334 0.0195
RESID^2(-3) -0.132187 -0.890733 0.3792
RESID^2(-4) -0.320548 -2.158693 0.0378
R-squared 0.216665     Mean dependent var 0.002439
Adjusted R-squared 0.127141     S.D. dependent var 0.003882
S.E. of regression 0.003627     Akaike info criterion -8.284564
Sum squared resid 0.00046     Schwarz criterion -8.073454
Log likelihood 170.6913     F-statistic 2.420188
Durbin-Watson stat 2.019427     Prob(F-statistic) 0.066768  
 
 





Mean       1.66E-15
Median   0.003306
Maximum 0.091521
Minimum -0.147835
Std. Dev.   0.052785
Skewness   -0.348915
Kurtosis   3.078721
Jarque-Bera 0.904131




Hypotheses on the non-linear relationship between loan stock 





Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.106 -0.101 0.920
MMRATE 0.789 5.096 0.000
GDPGAP -8.132 -3.161 0.003
EMU -0.591 -4.947 0.000
BNDRV 9.062 2.884 0.007
BNDRV(-5) 7.407 2.049 0.049
BR 0.076 2.090 0.045
BNKRPTC(-1) 0.001 3.474 0.002
@TREND 0.009 1.085 0.286
MMRATE^2 0.010 0.504 0.618
MMRATE(-1)^2 0.001 0.093 0.926
MMRATE(-2)^2 -0.003 -0.509 0.614
R-squared 0.994147     Mean dependent var 5.651523
Adjusted R-squared 0.992134     S.D. dependent var 1.871198
S.E. of regression 0.165953     Akaike info criterion -0.52723
Sum squared resid 0.88129     Schwarz criterion -0.04063
Log likelihood 23.599     F-statistic 494.0797
Durbin-Watson stat 1.56675     Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
Redundant Variables: MMRATE^2 MMRATE(-1)^2 MMRATE(-2)^2
F-statistic 0.175985     Probability 0.911871






Sample (adjusted): 1993Q2 2003Q4
Included observations: 43 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0,322 -0,870 0,391
PRIMEMEDIAN(-1) 0,271 1,763 0,088
MMRATE 0,319 0,905 0,372
MMRATE(-1) 0,803 1,709 0,097
MMRATE(-2) -0,653 -2,755 0,010
BR 0,398 5,087 0,000
BR(-1) -0,257 -2,174 0,037
BR(-2) 0,254 2,867 0,007
MMRATE^2 -0,003 -0,087 0,931
MMRATE(-1)^2 -0,052 -1,153 0,258
MMRATE(-2)^2 0,035 1,740 0,091
R-squared 0,988904     Mean dependent var 4,706395
Adjusted R-squared 9,85E-01     S.D. dependent var 1,5146
S.E. of regression 1,83E-01     Akaike info criterion -0,344943
Sum squared resid 1,06903     Schwarz criterion 0,105596
Log likelihood 18,41628     F-statistic 285,1926
Durbin-Watson stat 2,155448    Prob(F-statistic) 0,0000
Redundant Variables: MMRATE^2 MMRATE(-1)^2 MMRATE(-2)^2
F-statistic 1,174747     Probability 0,3347
Log likelihood ratio 4,492615    Probability 0,21295
Dependent variable: Median of major banks' prime rates
 
 
PRIMEMEDIAN is the median of the prime rates of the following banking 
groups: 
 
Q1/1993: Okobank group, Postipankki 
Q2/1993–Q1/1995: Okobank group, Postipankki, KOP, Union Bank of Finland 




Tests for the second loan stock equation 




Test Statistic Value   df     Probability
F-statistic 0.150326 (1, 38)   0.7004
Chi-square 0.150326 1 0.6982
Null Hypothesis Summary:
Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err.
-1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) + C(5) = 0 0.003782 0.009754
Restrictions are linear in coefficients.
RLB= C(1)+C(2)*RLB(-1)+C(3)*MMRATE+C(4)*MMRATE(-1)+C(5)







Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:
F-statistic 1.009723     Prob. F(4,35) 0.415692




Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) -0.0021 -0.0522 0.9587
C(2) 0.0074 0.2252 0.8231
C(3) -0.0107 -0.2115 0.8337
C(4) 0.0112 0.2310 0.8187
C(5) 0.0000 0.0619 0.9510
RESID(-1) -0.0515 -0.2933 0.7710
RESID(-2) -0.3037 -1.7182 0.0946
RESID(-3) -0.0865 -0.4591 0.6490
RESID(-4) 0.0549 0.2784 0.7823
R-squared 0.103458     Mean dependent var 4.03E-16
Adjusted R-squared -0.101466     S.D. dependent var 0.06783
S.E. of regression 0.071188     Akaike info criterion -2.266742
Sum squared resid 0.177369     Schwarz criterion -1.901794







F-statistic 1.330166     Prob. F(4,35) 0.278093




Sample (adjusted): 1994Q1 2003Q4
Included observations: 40 after adjustments
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.0026 2.3773 0.0230
RESID^2(-1) 0.1691 1.0142 0.3175
RESID^2(-2) 0.1545 1.1404 0.2619
RESID^2(-3) 0.0664 0.4865 0.6297
RESID^2(-4) -0.1461 -1.1871 0.2432
R-squared 0.131959     Mean dependent var 0.003501
Adjusted R-squared 0.032754     S.D. dependent var 0.004809
S.E. of regression 0.00473     Akaike info criterion -7.753286
Sum squared resid 0.000783     Schwarz criterion -7.542177
Log likelihood 160.0657     F-statistic 1.330166




Mean       4.03E-16
Median   0.002998
Maximum 0.138038
Minimum -0.171716
Std. Dev.   0.06783
Skewness   -0.202192
Kurtosis   2.989357
Jarque-Bera 0.300007









Mean       4,03E-16
Median   0,002998
Maximum 0,138038
Minimum -0,171716
Std. Dev.   0,06783
Skewness   -0,202192
Kurtosis   2,989357
Jarque-Bera 0,300007
Probability 0,860705   
44 
Appendix 8 
Correlations between regression residuals 
Residuals of the regressions presented in the tables 1, 4 and 7 
 
RLBRESID RLBNRESID RDTRESID
RLBRESID 1.0000 0.2001 0.1428
RLBNRESID 0.2001 1.0000 0.1333
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